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Abstract
Notwithstanding the speculations from the literature, the empirical analyses still neglect the convergence between pop-
ulism and technocracy. The Italian case can be of some interest in this perspective, given the rise of technocratic populism
since Silvio Berlusconi’s rise to power in 1994. By analyzing the style of leadership and the processes of ministerial appoint-
ment and delegation, we argue that Berlusconi has been a trendsetter, more than a coherent example of technocrat-
ic populist leader. On the one hand, he played the role of the entrepreneur in politics, promising to run the state as
a firm. Moreover, he adopted an anti-establishment appeal, delegitimizing political opponents and stressing the divide
between ‘us’ (hardworking ordinary people) and ‘them’ (incompetent politicians). On the other hand, however, his anti-elite
approach was mainly directed towards the ‘post-communist elite.’ Extending the analysis to the following two decades, we
introduce a diachronic comparison involving three examples of leadership somehow influenced by Berlusconi. MarioMonti
represents the paradox of the impossible hero: A pure technocrat unable to take a genuinely populist semblance. Matteo
Renzi represents the attempt to mix a populist party leadership with a technocratic chief executive style. Finally, Salvini
represents the pure nativist heir of Berlusconi, as the new leader of the right-wing camp. The latest developments of execu-
tive leadership in Italy, and the re-emergence of other residual hints of technocratic populism, will be discussed in the final
section of the article, also in the light of the evident impact of the 2020 pandemic outbreak on the practices of government.
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1. Introduction
Italian politics have recently offered a fascinating sce-
nario to assess the concept of ‘technocratic populism’
empirically. This notion refers to a ‘thin’ ideology that
rejects the traditional left–right dimension and promis-
es apolitical expert solutions safeguarding the ‘ordi-
nary people’ (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019, p. 304). Several
authors have placed the roots of a prototypical wealthy
techno-pop and businessman approach to political lead-
ership in the crisis of the mid-1990s when the model of
party-government democracy known as the ‘first Italian
republic’ was dissolved. 25 years later, the nature of
the new model of parliamentary democracy is still
under discussion. However, we know that the figure of
Silvio Berlusconiwas crucial to explain that transition and
some of the following political changes.
This thematic issue allows us to evaluate the novel-
ty emerged with the leadership of Berlusconi, and the
similarities in the styles of leadership occurred more
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recently on the Italian political scene. In this article,
we discuss the multidimensional nature of technocrat-
ic populism, contending that some of its elements have
been relevant during Berlusconi’s rise to power. Mixing
some prototypical elements of populism with the legit-
imacy of his professional expertise, he imposed a novel
form of leadership, which would have somehow inspired
other protagonists. However, such combined rhetoric
(unmediated political communication, business exper-
tise, decreasing party organizational influence, direct
legitimation of governmental leadership) has met sever-
al obstacles in the long run. Already during the consolida-
tion of Berlusconi’s leadership, some evident deviations
from the technocratic populism model emerged. Other
elements of variation from the model arose during the
2010s, when several political leaders tried to take the
baton of Berlusconi original style. However, they moved
towards different types of leadership.
After a brief conceptual overview and a short pre-
sentation of the origins of Italian technocratic pop-
ulism, we summarize the main elements of Berlusconi’s
approach as an adaptive and pragmatic leader, able to
play the role of technocratic populism’ trendsetter’ but
also to significantly deviate from his original model dur-
ing his staying-in-power. This account is complemented
by looking to other influential leaderships—MarioMonti,
Matteo Renzi, andMatteo Salvini—selected on the bases
of ‘most dissimilar’ career characteristics. This compara-
tive analysis brings us to evaluate the controversial lega-
cy of technocratic populism in Italy. The formation of the
Conte II government (2019) and the peculiar situation
of the limitation of parliamentary democracy during the
Covid-19 crisis (2020) affect the irregular trend of pop-
ulist leadership in Italy once again. However, a few latent
and persisting elements of the model still may be found,
which let us think that the era of technocratic populism
may not be closed.
2. Populism, Technocracy and Technocratic Populism
In recent years, populism has become a hot topic in
the academic debate. Consequently, the scientific liter-
ature on this phenomenon has expanded exponential-
ly (e.g., Barr, 2009; Castaldo, 2018; Eatwell & Goodwin,
2018; Hawkins, Carlin, Littvay, & Rovira Kaltwasser,
2019; Moffitt, 2016; Pappas, 2019; Rovira Kaltwasser,
Taggart, Ochoa Espejo, &Ostiguy, 2017; Zulianello, 2020).
The intense academic debate has led to several interpre-
tations of such a ‘slippery concept.’ Firstly, populism has
been conceived as a thin and adaptable ideology that
sees society as characterized by the divide between the
‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupted elite’ (Mudde, 2004).
Secondly, populism has been interpreted as a rhetoric
that takes advantage of diffuse public sentiments of
anxiety, pushing the ordinary people to challenge the
political establishment (Abt & Rummens, 2007). Thirdly,
several contributions focused on populism as a type
of organization, characterized by the presence of (new
kind of) charismatic leaders (Taggart, 2000). Finally, pop-
ulism has been seen as a style of communication that
bypasses intermediaries and establishes a direct con-
nection between the leader and the people (Jagers &
Walgrave, 2007).
Despite such a variety of interpretations, the critical
element at the core of all these definitions is the focus on
‘the people.’ Populism is based on the idea that the polit-
ical establishment ignores the aspirations of the people
and that a charismatic leader is able to connect directly
with the people and to speak on its behalf (Caiani, 2019).
Obviously, the definition of this crucial element appears
to be ambiguous when used by different populists, and
various studies try to clarifywho ‘the people’ actually are.
Canovan (1984) identifies three possible populist rhetor-
ical interpretations of the people: 1) A nativist version
where the ‘us’ is the ‘nation’ and the ‘them’ are migrants
and ethnic/religious minorities; 2) the people intended
in economic terms, as the ‘underdog,’ which is character-
ized by an intense hostility to economic differences; and
3) a focus on the ‘ordinary people’ and a nostalgic desire
for a simpler life.
Other classifications distinguish between ‘exclusion-
ary’ radical-right populism and ‘inclusionary’ radical-left
populism (Abt & Rummens, 2007; Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2013). This distinction recalls, respectively,
the first two types identified by Canovan. A third catego-
ry, so far identified as ‘mainstream populism’ (e.g., Tony
Blair; see Mair, 2002) or ‘center-right populism’ (e.g.,
Silvio Berlusconi; see Pasquino, 2007), is also relevant.
This kind of populism, somehow related to Canovan’s
third type, is less polarizing than the inclusionary and
exclusionary model, focusing on moderate and govern-
mental actors. Technocratic populism can be located in
this third category (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019).
Following the definition of technocratic populism
provided above, we highlight the core dimensions of this
new form of populism: A ‘thin’ anti-elite ideology that
emerges in critical junctures, rejecting the traditional
left–right divide and delegitimizing political opponents.
The legitimation strategy includes the promise to run
the state as a firm, offering expertise to solve the prob-
lems of ordinary people. Once in power, technocratic
populism’s survival strategy is based mainly on two pil-
lars: Attempts to instill civic apathy and discourage mobi-
lization thanks to the formal adoption of a ‘technocratic’
approach to governance; adoption of short-term policies
that allows them to keep voter support, and a combina-
tion of redistributive and pro-market policies (Buštíková
& Guasti, 2019; Havlík, 2019).
Given this conceptualization, technocratic populism
represents a strong critique of the crucial institutions
and practices of representative democracy. Indeed, both
the constituting elements of technocratic populism
emerged recently as two of the most relevant argu-
ments to dispute the party government model of rep-
resentative democracy (Caramani, 2017). Despite the
antagonism between the primary goal of populism—
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restoring people’s power—and the technocratic goal
of empowering experts (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017),
these two elements also share a few features. Both of
them picture themselves as anti-politics, sharing a mini-
malist/Schumpeterian interpretation of democracy and
claiming that the left–right dimension should not mat-
ter anymore. Hence, the real enemy of technocratic pop-
ulism is the party government model. Due to their non-
pluralistic conception of society, promoters of techno-
cratic populism shared the idea of a united general inter-
est and the will to establish a relationship between the
people and the elite, which is not mediated by polit-
ical parties or other kinds of intermediary institutions
(Bickerton & Accetti, 2017; Caramani, 2017).
In this general frame, the present article will try
to answer two questions: At first, what about the
endurance of Berlusconi’s original technocratic populism
model? Secondly, what are the legacies of such a mod-
el? The first question will be approached looking to the
diachronic evolution of Berlusconi’s leadership,while the
second one may be explored by comparing the experi-
ences of some of the most influencial Italian leaders of
the past two decades.
More in detail, we will start from the analysis of the
long-term evolution of a trendsetter technocratic pop-
ulism leader who was able to stand as the most durable
candidate premier between 1994 and 2013 (Table 1).
At the beginning of such a period, Berlusconi represent-
ed an innovative leadership, challenging two figures con-
nected to the previous party government model: the
ex-communist Occhetto and the ex-Christian Democrat
Segni. Later, Berlusconi won the 2001 and 2008 elections
while he was defeated two times (1996 and 2006) by the
centre-left coalition led by Romano Prodi, a reputed for-
mer technocrat and policy expert who expressed a weak
leadership since he was never able to build his person-
al party. To find other leaders assimilable to the tech-
nocratic populism model, Italians had to wait until 2013,
when the technocratic primeministerMarioMonti decid-
ed to run the political competition, leading a centrist car-
tel (and a personal party at the core of such a coalition).
Monti ranked only fourth in a complicated electoral con-
test, where nobody won. Indeed, all the leaders standing
for the prime ministerial post renounced, and the politi-
cal game expressed, during the following legislative term,
three governmental leaders from the Democratic Party.
Among these three, we selected Matteo Renzi, who
cumulated the positions of party secretary and prime
minister (2014–2016), reaching high peaks of popularity,
but proposing himself as a highly divisive leader. Renzi’s
resignation opened another political season that culmi-
nated in the 2018 elections. During such a period, anoth-
er significant leadership has been that of Matteo Salvini,
who became the leader of the centre-right coalition and
probably the most popular personality during the short
period of the Conte I government (2018–2019). In this
cabinet, Salvini served as vice-prime minister and minis-
ter of interior. In sum, Monti (the prime minister who
succeeded the trendsetter, as a potential technocratic
populist political leader), Renzi (the main political oppo-
nent of the latest Berlusconi, often associated to him in
terms of style and assertiveness) and Salvini (Berlusconi’s
successor as a leader of the conservative camp) consti-
tute three dissimilar cases of personalities whomay have
inherited some (but only some) traits of the technocrat-
ic populism model. In the concluding section, we also
focus on the personality of Giuseppe Conte, a secondary
character of the Five Star Movement (5SM) who showed
a relevant political talent, surviving to the breakdown
of the populist alliance with Salvini to offer himself as
the quasi-technocratic leader of a new coalition with the
Democratic party. The emergence of the pandemic out-
break allowed Conte to build a new variant of primemin-
isterial style, which we will discuss in the frame of the
technocratic populism model.
3. From the Sunset of ‘Partitocrazia’ to the Rise of
Technocratic Populism (1983–1994)
Several studies have supported the interpretation of the
Italian First Republic as a paradigmatic example of strong
party-government. However, doubts have been raised
Table 1. Competition for prime ministerial leadership in Italy (1994–2020).
1994–1996 1996–2001 2001–2006 2006–2008 2008–2013 2013–2018 2018–2020
Electoral Berlusconi (CR) Prodi (CL) Berlusconi (CR) Prodi (CL) Berlusconi (CR)
legitimacy
Challengers Occhetto (L) Berlusconi (CR) Rutelli (CL) Berlusconi (CR) Veltroni (CL) Bersani (CL) Salvini (CR)
Segni (C) Monti (C) Renzi (CL)
Berlusconi (CR) Di Maio (5SM)
??? (5SM)
Stand-in Dini (Tech) D’Alema (CL) Monti (Tech) Letta (CL) Conte (FSM/Tech)
leader Amato (CL) Renzi (CL)
Gentiloni (CL)
Note: L = left; R = right; C = centre; Tech = technocrat.
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about the extension of ‘partyness of government’ (Katz,
1987), analyzing the overall process of policy-making
(Cotta & Verzichelli, 1996). An unusual element of tech-
nocratic presence during that political age consisted of
the recruitment of a few ‘non-partisan ministers’ who
helped the Italian coalition governments to overcome
policy disagreements and transaction costs (Verzichelli &
Cotta, 2018). However, technocratic ministers never con-
stituted an autonomous actor until the 1980s, when the
reputation of the traditional governing parties started
to vanish. The most significant technocratic ‘voice’ dur-
ing that period was that of Guido Carli, former governor
of the Italian central bank, who served twice as minis-
ter of treasury. Carli and other technocratic personali-
ties pushed the Italian government to support the Delors
Plan and the Maastricht Treaty as an act of loyalty to the
traditional Italian pro-Europeanism, despite this treaty
would have imposed severe retrenchment policies.
Personalities of Europeanist experts (officers of
Bankitalia, state managers, and academics) constitut-
ed the ‘technocratic face’ in the Italian debate at the
end of the age of ‘partitocrazia,’ representing a grow-
ing segment of the ‘ministerial elite’ (Verzichelli & Cotta,
2018). Since the mid-1990s, Italy experienced three
non-partisan and technocratic prime ministers (Carlo
Azelio Ciampi in 1993, Lamberto Dini in 1995, and Mario
Monti in 2011) and a relevant number of unelected and
non-aligned ministers, vice-ministers and junior minis-
ters in all the executives alternating in power (Table 2).
Another relevant change during that period of cri-
sis was the resurgence of evident hints of populist men-
tality. The anti-party sentiments already present at the
times of the affirmation of the Common Man’s Front in
1946 (Corduwener, 2017; Tarchi, 2015) were nurturing
the growing consensus to local civic lists and regional-
ist movements that elected a few MPs in the late 1980s.
Among them, Umberto Bossi, the leader of Lombard
autonomists, who merged the small regionalist parties
from the wealthy Italian Northern area into a single
movement. Although present only in a few regions, the
Northern League reached the astonishing result of 8% of
the vote (nationwide) in the 1992 elections.
In its early days as a parliamentary actor, the
Northern League supported another fundamental sym-
bol of populism: The idea that judiciary power should
be elevated as the emblematic force of people’s moral-
ity against the madness of politicians. Indeed, mistrust
of parties and politicians led to the rise of other pop-
ulist figures, as the former Tangentopoli prosecutor and
champion of justicialism, Antonio Di Pietro. However,
nobody had been able to mix technocracy and populism
in the Italian debate until the famous TV announcement
of the direct engagement in politics of Silvio Berlusconi
(25 January 1994).
4. Berlusconi as a Trendsetter of Italian Technocratic
Populism
In Berlusconi’s rhetoric, the praise of technocracy was
immediately evident, taking a fundamental role during
the phase of his rise to power. The man who had gained
popularity as an entrepreneur, business, andmedia inno-
vator was now offering his service to the whole people.
This idea of a skill-based political leadership came togeth-
er with purely populistic references: the superiority of
an Italian way of living and the importance of self-made
men. AsMarco Tarchi argues (2015, p. 278), thismild vari-
ance of populism was much more successful than oth-
Table 2. Technocratic and non-elected members of the government in Italy (1994–2020).
Entire Government Cabinet ministers
% No parliamentary % No parliamentary
% Non-partisan experience N % Non-partisan experience N
Berlusconi I (1994) 3.1 6.3 64 7.7 11.5 26
Dini (1995) 96.3 94.4 54 95.0 90.0 20
Prodi I (1996) 10.1 17.4 69 14.3 19.0 21
D’Alema I (1998) 6.0 15.5 84 3.7 25.9 27
D’Alema I (1999) 3.0 11.1 99 0 15.4 26
Amato II (2000) 4.9 5.0 81 7.7 19.2 26
Berlusconi II (2001) 4.8 10.7 84 8.0 20.0 25
Berlusconi III (2005) 2.0 10.9 101 3.8 15.4 26
Prodi II (2006) 7.7 26.9 104 3.8 11.5 26
Berlusconi IV (2008) 1.6 9.8 61 0 4.5 22
Monti (2011) 94.0 96.0 50 100 100 20
Letta (2013) 15.4 33.8 65 13.6 31.8 22
Renzi (2014) 8.1 27.4 62 11.8 35.3 17
Gentiloni (2016) 4.9 19.7 61 5.3 31.6 19
Conte I (2018) 9.2 22.7 66 21.1 40 20
Conte II (2019) 1.6 19.0 63 4.5 27.3 22
Source: CIRCaP (n.d.).
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er popular figures of that time, as the aforementioned
Di Pietro.
Since the fortune of technocratic populism in Italy
is inextricably linked to the political trajectory of
Berlusconi, we can apply this framework to better
explain the relevance of this leader in shaping the dif-
ferent narratives that have crossed the Italian politics.
Accordingly, we distinguish the phase of the rise-to-
power, when Berlusconi came closer to a pure defini-
tion of technocratic populism, from his staying-in-power
when he significantly deviated from the model.
In terms of genesis and favorable circumstances for
technocratic populism, the Italian case confirms the role
of critical junctures. The 1992–1994 period represent-
ed fertile ground for such a new narrative. Berlusconi
emerged when a deep political crisis generated by cor-
ruption and economic recessions had wiped out the old
party system. The consequent widespread popular dis-
trust represented a perfect climate for an anti-political
message (Tarchi, 2008), focused on the juxtaposition
of the inefficient (and corrupted) elite and the image
of social fixer and representative of (hardworking) peo-
ple that Berlusconi offered to his voters (Ruzza & Fella,
2011). Ideas like the ‘liberal revolution’ and the ‘new
Italianmiracle’ constituted the promise of social changes
not promoted by “just another party or faction born
to divide, but from a positive force which comes now
to unify” (Berlusconi, 2000, authors’ translation; Foot,
2014). Although the very first act of ‘taking the field’ was
an explicit invitation to prevent the victory of the left
(the communists, according to Berlusconi), the tradition-
al left–right cleavage was somehow abandoned and sub-
stituted by a vertical one, opposing the corrupted ‘ruling
class’ to the ordinary people (Zaslove, 2008). However,
Berlusconi was soon able to occupy the whole center-
right camp renovating the old anti-communist argument
used in the late 1940s by the Christian Democracy, which
gave new significance to the left–right cleavage. Indeed,
Berlusconi demonized former Communists (or more gen-
erally the ‘leftists’) as ‘enemies’ unworthy of either gov-
ernmental responsibilities or political respect. Left lead-
ers were presented as recycled politicians from the post-
war politics and as representatives of an out of touch left-
liberal and metropolitan caste (Fella & Ruzza, 2013).
The promise to run the state as a firm is anoth-
er crucial technocratic populism element touched by
Berlusconi’s narrative. Presenting himself as a ‘man of
providence’ and projecting the image of a successful self-
made entrepreneur (Orsina, 2013), Berlusconi instilled in
the electorate the idea that he would be as successful
in running the state as he had been in building his eco-
nomic empire. He stressed his purpose to use the typical
private-sector managerial skills to improve the efficiency
of the state (Bickerton & Accetti, 2014). This approach
was also evident in the innovative procedures he intro-
duced in the process of party building and in promot-
ing political mobilization campaigns. The business-party
example of Forza Italia (‘Go Italy!’; Paolucci, 2008) was
initially shaped with the help of several pollsters and pro-
moters. The members of the early ruling class of Forza
Italia were all personalities from the entourage of the
tycoon: managers of the family holding Publitalia, long-
time members of the editorial teams of his TV networks
and newspaper, and lawyers and consultants close to
him and his family. The process of parliamentary recruit-
ment was run by candidature casting and other market-
ing techniques (Verzichelli, 1998).
As said, Berlusconi organized his campaigns around
the figure of the entrepreneur as a self-made man. The
clear message from his phase of rising-in-power was
that everybody is a potential entrepreneur (Bickerton
& Accetti, 2014) and that the same passion and requi-
sites that make a good entrepreneur may make a good
political leader. Such rhetoric allowed him to abandon
the sophisticated political language of the First Republic,
using a more pragmatic and somehow vulgar language.
The name of the party recalled the chant of supporters of
the national soccer team, which meant to appeal holisti-
cally to the entire nation (Ragazzoni, in press). He empha-
sized that Italians are good just as they are, and stat-
ed that politicians were responsible for all the problems
of Italian society (Orsina, 2013). In his addresses, he
offered hope and other positive words (miracle, trust,
dream, happiness) and statements like “the victory of
love over hate and envy” or that his party is the “par-
ty of love’’ (Berlusconi, as cited in Körösényi & Patkos,
2017, p. 616).
The leadership of Berlusconi never fitted the techno-
cratic populism ideal-type completely. For example, he
never implemented direct demobilization strategies aim-
ing at instilling civic apathy. However, most of his dis-
tinctive features resembled, during the rising-in-power
phase, such a theoretical scheme. The strong message
against the party government model and the emphasis
on his role as a social and professional leader, more than
as a party leader, support this claim. The direct appeal
to the Italian people—another fundamental element of
his narrative—was the main indicator of the distance
he took from the old ‘partitocrazia’ (Bickerton & Accetti,
2014). The same direct appeal explained his extraordi-
nary peaks of personal consensus at the time of his 1994
victory and even during the first year of his government
in 2001 (Bellucci, 2006).
Most of these elements have been recurrent dur-
ing Berlusconi’s long political career. However, after
consolidating the leadership of the center-right camp,
Berlusconi and his party went through a process of
adaptation and ‘normalization,’ which led to a partial
departure from the technocratic populism model. First,
despite remaining a personal party incapable of full insti-
tutionalization due to Berlusconi’s charismatic leader-
ship, Forza Italia went through a process of consolida-
tion with the entering of relevant cadres from Socialist
and Christian democratic traditions. Moreover, its legiti-
mation was boosted by Forza Italia’s acceptance into the
European People’s Party in 1998. Second, Berlusconi’s
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anti-political and anti-establishment stances were better
specified: Instead of overcoming the left–right cleavage,
he stressed its significance consolidating his position as
the leader of the center-right coalition, and orienting his
anti-elite appeal against the post-communist left. Thus,
anti-communism became the ideological glue of the new
coalition (Ruzza & Fella, 2011). Berlusconi repeatedly uti-
lized such an argument to demonize not only the post-
communist parties but also relevant functional elites
(e.g., judiciary or media; Ragazzoni, in press; Verbeek &
Zaslove, 2016). A significant consequence of this process
of ‘normalization’ was the reduction of Berlusconi’s chal-
lenge to the party government model. Forza Italia thus
became a mainstream ‘anti-populist’ party opposing the
argument of the 5SM and, to some extent, of other radi-
cal parties of the centre-right coalition.
Third, the adoption of technocratic expertise as a sig-
nificant criterion of ministers’ selection remained some-
how present, but it never became crucial in Berlusconi’s
practice of government (Table 2). He actually selected a
few technocratic ministers (none in his last executive),
but not a higher percentage than those appointed by
center-left governments in the same period (Verzichelli
& Cotta, 2018). Moreover, some of Berlusconi’s techno-
cratic ministers were fired or forced to resign more often
than the ‘purely political’ ministers (Verzichelli, 2009).
Other reflections bring us to define the adaptive
nature of Berlusconi’s approach to technocratic pop-
ulism during his long staying-in-power. On the one hand,
after the end of his first government and the 1996 elec-
toral defeat, Berlusconi introduced precise references
to the republican history (e.g., the role of De Gasperi,
the centrality of the European people party, the role
of European Integration). These references boosted his
legitimation both at the national and international lev-
els, and prepared his political revenge: the great victo-
ry of 2001, the ‘contract with Italians’ and his return
to government. On the other hand, the anti-political
rhetoric kept being a character of his leadership even
after the 2001 election, when Berlusconi dissipated lots
of governing energies in his fight with media and judges
(Bickerton & Accetti, 2014). Several episodes can be
recalled in this respect; for instance, the ‘Bulgarian Edict’:
An interview given during a visit to Sofia when, in fact,
the leader asked the removal of three ‘unwelcome’
programs from public television. Or even the frequent
announcements of a reform of the judiciary (complet-
ed in 2004) were presented as a crucial action to “get
back judges on the track.” All these episodes were patent
elements of the resiliency of the original style. One
can say that the features of the ‘caiman’—technocratic
populist symbology and a ‘vocal’ style of permanent
campaigner—alternated to a modest action as policy
innovator, which never revolutionized the machinery
of the state, the government and most of the policy
domains. This explains why the experience in govern-
ment of Berlusconi remained, in fact, within the frame-
works of standard politics (Pasquino, 2012).
5. Competitors but Disciples: Three Deviations from
Berlusconi’s Technocratic Populism
Berlusconi’s experience left a clear mark on Italian pol-
itics, which may have influenced the strategies of oth-
er leaders. We argue that the erratic transformation of
Italian politics did not follow the peculiar technocrat-
ic populism model traced by Berlusconi, while remain-
ing somehow influenced by that. This assertion can
be supported by evaluating three different types of
leadership emerged during the 2010s: Mario Monti,
Matteo Renzi and Matteo Salvini. They may have relied
on some aspects of the technocratic populism model.
For instance, the self-made man nature of the leader, his
policy expertise, the anti-establishment appeal, the hier-
archical conception of the personal party.
5.1. Mario Monti: The ‘Technocratic Opponent’
Appointed as prime minister in 2011 to deal with the
consequences of the economic crisis, after a phase
of turmoil for Berlusconi IV government (Pasquino &
Valbruzzi, 2012), Monti formed an apolitical executive
(100% of non-partisan ministers; Culpepper, 2014) and
almost fully technocratic government (88.9% of expert
ministers; Verzichelli & Cotta, 2018). A former European
commissioner for competition and president of Bocconi
University, Monti was a perfect technocrat, but sure-
ly not a technocratic populist. In some sense, he tried
to take the opposite direction of Berlusconi’s trajectory,
when he decided to lead a political cartel in 2013. During
the electoral campaign, he launched clear populist mes-
sages. In particular, he tried to emulate Berlusconi in cir-
culating the ideas of a skill-based leadership and of a self-
made man. Just to give a colorful example, as the leader
of Forza Italia involved his pet dog during the campaign
Monti adopted one too. He promised radical and sub-
stancial changes moving from a position of centrist and
‘mainstream’ institutional office-holder, but also focus-
ing on pure populist messages as ‘iron hand’ against rich
people evading taxes. He finally tried (in vain) to be less
‘academic’ and more ‘ordinary people-like.’ In the end,
Monti’s cartel reached less than 10% of the votes in the
election that consecrated the populist 5SM. This elec-
toral defeat also represented the end of Monti’s party,
which imploded after a few months.
This example resembles the experience of Jan Fischer,
who led a popular technocratic government in Czech
Republic between 2009 and 2010, running as an inde-
pendent candidate in the next 2013 presidential elec-
tions (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). Both cases highlight
the differences between a succesfull technocrat and a
technocratic populist: There are few chances to trans-
form a remarkable personal popularity based on tech-
nocratic credentials, if that candidate is unable to run
a populist campaign. Especially when other influential
populist competitors emerge. A similar story is repre-
sented by another Italian technocratic prime minister:
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Lamberto Dini (former higher officer of the Bank of
Italy) who was appointed as a prime minister in 1995.
Successively, he started a little centrist party that joined
the centre-left coalition, producing a very modest politi-
cal impact. In the end, themore influential Italian techno-
cratic prime minister was Carlo Azelio Ciampi. A former
Governor of the Central Bank appointed prime minister
in 1993 in the middle of the Tangentopoli storm, Ciampi
becameminister of the treasury during the crucial phase
of the Euro takeover, and (in 1999) President of the
Republic. This without assuming any formal party affili-
ation and being always out of the daily political debate.
Therefore, the ‘pure technocrat’ Ciampi seems to have
had a much longer and stable political influence than
ambitious ‘technocrats in politics’ like Dini and Monti.
5.2. Matteo Renzi: A True Heir in the Other Camp?
Among the narratives here analyzed, that of Renzi is
the closest to the first image Berlusconi’s leadership.
After all, many have identified the former prime min-
ister and Democratic Party leader as the true heir of
Berlusconi, though expressed by the opposing political
camp. However, the commonalities between these two
leaderships are mostly related to the classical features of
populism, rather than technocratic populism.
The rise of Renzi’s leadership occurred during a criti-
cal juncture, thanks to his feature of (party) outsider and
to a certain anti-establishment appeal. Renzi was already
a young career politician and the mayor of Florence,
but his approach shares some essential elements with
the first Berlusconi technocratic populismmodel. Indeed,
after the unexpected affirmation in the primary elections
contest for the city of Florence (2008) and the good result
in his first attempt at the 2010 Democratic Party national
secretary election (marked by the slogan “let’s scrap old
politicians”), he got the party leadership in 2013. Then,
he became prime minister in 2014 (Bordignon, 2014).
Renzi’s anti-establishment appeal is peculiar.
Although he had a clear party connotation, like
Berlusconi he addressed a sharp criticism to the party
elite, and particularly to the post-communist party oli-
garchy. Renzi’s political project was connected to the
concept of scrapping (rottamazione), which meant the
demotion of thewhole party’s establishment (Bordignon,
2014). An ‘us versus them’ characterized his rhetoric,
where party oligarchies represented the ‘them’ while
the ordinary people constituted the ‘us.’ Thanks to this
rhetoric, Renzi projected an image of an outsider and
self-made leader just as Berlusconi did in 1994. In doing
so, he obtained an even higher rate of personal consen-
sus as a chief executive. According to the pollster Demos
& Pi (n.d.), the popularity of Renzi as leader reached the
astonishing level of 74% in June 2014, 4months after the
formation of his government, while the decline started
in January 2015.
During Renzi’s staying-in-power, the ‘us versus them’
divide was expanded, going beyond the boundaries of
the party and criticizing the economic and financial pow-
er (e.g., banks).Moreover, he attacked the traditional cul-
tural establishment of the left party, dominated by trade
unions and bureaucrats. The ideawas to elaborate a post-
ideological political proposal and a catch-all electoral
strategy focused on concepts as innovation, rapidity, and
education to appeal to all Italians beyond the classical
left–right divide, as Berlusconi did in 1994 (Bordignon,
2014). The style of communication was the dimension
in which Renzi wasmore ‘inspired’ by Berlusconi. Both of
themused simple and popular language, abandoning the
formal code of politics, with the same aim of establishing
a direct and emotional connection with ordinary people
(Bickerton & Accetti, 2014). Renzi, in particular, focused
on young people, making frequent references to Matt
Groening’s The Simpsons or Mary Poppins. His language
was simple and made up of slogans and catchphrases,
with a rhetorical use of ‘stories’ of ordinary citizens. Just
as Berlusconi, Renzi used the language of hope and love.
He affirmed, for example, that mayors write love letters
to their cities everyday (Bordignon, 2014).
As said, these similarities relate to classical fea-
tures of populism. The same cannot be said about the
technocratic side of technocratic populism. Contrary to
Berlusconi, Renzi never exploited the idea of running the
state as a firm, despite several elements stress the pres-
ence of some kind of technocracy. In particular, we can
mention the following: On the one hand, the plebiscitary
approach with the invocation of direct democracy and
the attacks on the role of parties; on the other hand, his
idea of dirigisme, with a set of policy proposals defined
in advance, and thus no longer in need of public debate
or justification (Bickerton & Accetti, 2014). Moreover, in
his government, he selected a higher percentage of tech-
nocratic and non-partisan ministers if compared with
Berlusconi (Table 2).
Another difference between Renzi and Berlusconi
concerns their anti-elite approach. While the latter used
the classical antithetical categories of ‘elite’ and (hard-
working) ‘people,’ the former introduced a generational
divide. However, just as Berlusconi did with the cate-
gory of ‘entrepreneur,’ Renzi offered an idea of gen-
erational change as a condition of a new spirit of
progress (Bickerton & Accetti, 2014). The relationship
with their respective parties was another difference
between Berlusconi and Renzi. The latter attempted to
de-institutionalize his party, aiming at transforming the
Democratic Party in a light, open, and leader-centered
party (Bordignon, 2014). However, he never reached the
full control exerted by the former on Forza Italia until he
founded his own small (but personal) party, Italy Alive
(Italia Viva) in 2019.
5.3. Matteo Salvini: The Nativist Heir of Berlusconi
Matteo Salvini is the successor of Berlusconi as center-
right coalition leader. Journalistic and academic analy-
ses often stress the line of continuity between the old
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tycoon and the new sovereignist leader, focusing on their
strong sense of party personalization, as well as their
media omnipresence.
Between his election as Lega Nord’s leader in 2013
and his political consecration—the 2018 election when
the League for Salvini Premier (a new party name mark-
ing a clear personalist and nationalistic drift) became
the largest party of the center-right coalition—Salvini
imposed a significant change both to the strategy and
the discourse of his party. Besides the abandonment of
the traditional federal issue, he flirtedwith fascist groups
and oriented the party toward some of the classical rad-
ical right issues. For instance, anti-immigration and anti-
globalization claims (Caiani, 2019; Pucciarelli, 2016).
A closer look to his political trajectory confirms
that Salvini has somehow shared a few features of
Berlusconi’s technocratic populism. As the ‘maestro,’ he
developed his leadership during a critical juncture of par-
ty scandals and consolidated it thanks to the adversar-
ial mode taken by the party against the previous ‘pro-
Europeanist elites’ after the economic crisis 2008–2013.
As Berlusconi, he claimed to be an outsider: despite
the fact that he had always been a professional politi-
cian, Salvini had no previous party/governmental roles.
His anti-elite approach was often oriented against the
‘left establishment’ and against the national and supra-
national ‘strong powers.’ Moreover, he developed an
assertive style of communication, based on vulgar lan-
guage and direct connection with the people. In this
regard, Salvini even surpassed Berlusconi, adopting a
form of mobilization that resembles the pure populist
style. Indeed, he boosted a state of permanent electoral
campaign, as Trump did in the USA.
It is worth to pause when the problem of ‘staying-
in-power’ comes, to distinguish the purely (right) pop-
ulist drift of Salvini. Differently from Berlusconi, the per-
sonalization of the Northern League did not follow a
‘franchising strategy’ and did not reach the same level
of Forza Italia, although he was more successful than,
for example, Renzi in de-institutionalizing his own par-
ty. Moreover, ideologically he joined the new European
(and international) radical right adopting a nativist per-
spective (no migrants, Italians first) and a deep anti-
Europeanist stance (Albertazzi, Giovannini, & Seddone,
2018). These rhetoric images became, after the 2018
elections, more relevant than the classical people ver-
sus élites divide. Moreover, instead of focusing on tech-
nocratic management of the state, Salvini impressed a
pure political meaning to his participation in the first
Conte government. Indeed, he was the most vocal polit-
ical guide, and he tried to balance the non-partisan
nature of the Prime minister with a broad action on dif-
ferent fields of the whole governmental agenda. In doing
so, he marked a relevant difference in comparison to
the other vice-premier: the 5SM leader Luigi Di Maio
(Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2019). The critical targets of
Salvini’s rhetoric were, in particular, multiculturalism,
the politics of retrenchment, and the subordination to
the European technocracy. Thanks to the continuous use
of these issues, Salvini built his role as a purely right-
nativist populist leader.
6. Conclusion: Technocratic Populism Legacies in Italy
and the Outbreak Crisis
As we stressed in the introduction, although emerged
only during the rising phase of Berlusconi, technocrat-
ic populism had evident roots in Italy, due to an ances-
tral populist mentality and a recurrent demand for ‘real
skills,’ technocratic actions, and limitations of party gov-
ernment. Writing two (complicate) years after the begin-
ning of the XVIII legislative term, marked by the entrance
in the government of a purely populist party like 5SM,
which was the strongest party to support both govern-
ments formed by Giuseppe Conte in 2018 and 2019, we
may hypothesize that some of these elements are still
latent and they may come back, although taking differ-
ent routes. The uncertainties of this troublesome period
and the 2020 pandemic outbreak may represent a new
critical juncture to be governed by changeable and adap-
tive political narratives. This may lead, in turn, to the rise
of a new peculiar form of technocratic populism.
The persisting debate on pros and cons of party gov-
ernment is the first element we can recall to support our
impressionistic assertion. The Conte II government was
formed in 2019 to reach a new political equilibrium con-
cerning the Italy–EU relationship and in several other pol-
icy fields. Conte, a non-partisan figure initially recruited
by the 5SM as a potential candidate for the role of minis-
ter of public administration reforms, had been promot-
ed to the office of chief executive in 2018, having the
two leaders of the populist coalition (Salvini and DiMaio)
as vice-prime ministers. After the breakdown of the pop-
ulist alliance with the League, 5SM joined its forces with
the Democratic Party, Liberi andUguali and the small per-
sonal party recently formed by Renzi. To some extent,
this can be seen as the return to a more ‘familiar’ party-
government coalition. However, the growing personal
popularity (more than 70% in the spring of 2020; see
Demos & Pi, n.d.) and the growing independence of the
prime minister, both of them boosted by the pandem-
ic crisis, could allow him to play an increasingly political
rather than purely technocratic role. Conte could take
the lead of a new type of coalition and play the role
of a competent professional ‘brought into real politics.’
Hence, the resurgence of some technocratic populism
traits looks possible during such a complicated situation.
A second intriguing element in the evolution of the
leadership of Giuseppe Conte during the outbreak emer-
gency is the notion of political responsibility in the
context of a permanent change of political agendas.
The direct connection between the government and the
scientific community, the timely decisions imposed by
the crisis, and the trade-off between safety and sup-
port to the economy, may have fostered his political
leadership. He can be said ‘more competent’ than ordi-
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nary politicians, not too connected to ideologies and,
above all, foreign to any party machinery. In this circum-
stance, Conte has therefore played the role of the expert
state-manager, assuring his responsiveness by issuing
prompt regulatory measures (both during and after the
lock-down) and making extensive use of urgent legisla-
tive decrees. More importantly, from our perspective,
Conte has developed a rather personalized communica-
tive strategy. More precisely, he has directly addressed
the public, and sometimes he has exploited some insti-
tutional events to attack opposition figures (in particu-
lar the sovereignist leaders Salvini and Meloni) openly.
But he has sometimes taken distance also from the same
political forces of his parliamentary majority. During
the outbreak, Conte has been extraordinarily active on
media and social networks, illustrating his visions for the
prospective re-launch of the country. In doing so, he has
offered his role as a political fixer to solve the dilem-
ma between the confinement measures inspired by and
definedwith the scientific community (technocratic side)
and the needs of the countless sectors of the Italian soci-
ety penalized by the crisis (populist side).
Conte was heavily criticized by almost all the party
leaders (both from the majority and the opposition) for
the excessive use of decrees and a growing reliance on
his technocratic team (extended during the Covid-19 out-
break to a considerable number of ‘scientific advisors’).
Though justifiable by the critical situation, these behav-
iors may also be seen as possible signs of an emerging
challenge to the parliament and representative democ-
racy. Conte cannot count on the personal resources of
Berlusconi or the political resources that Renzi had in
2014. He will probably be forced to risk everything in the
game of his leadership transformation, being tempted
to adopt a more technocratic populist profile. However,
such a fluid situation leaves many options still open.
In sum, what we have learned, applying the catego-
ry of technocratic populism to 25 years of Italian poli-
tics, is that, notwithstanding the relevance of Berlusconi
as a trendsetter and an inspiring model of a business-
party leader, Italy was not the land of technocratic pop-
ulist conquest. Only the short experience of Renzi as par-
ty (and governmental) leader can be, to some extent,
associated with this ideal-type. However, after discover-
ing the applicability of a mix between elements of pop-
ulist mentality and features of technocratic government,
Italians are still exposed to such a temptation. Conte, cer-
tainly not a populist party leader and a weak technocrat-
ic chief executive at the beginning of his political expe-
rience in 2018, has become a completely different fig-
ure. He may be somehow associated with the return of
some elements of technocratic populism, especially in
the aftermath of the 2020 outbreak.
In other words, if all the political narratives we have
shortly reported above can be compared to the tech-
nocratic populism model inspired and interpreted by
Berlusconi at the beginning of his political trajectory, all
of them had to rearrange the samemodel in a rather rad-
ical way. Conte seems to have built his political leader-
ship from a completely different perspective. But he also
presents an interesting adaptive approach, which may
lead him to rediscover the advantages of technocratic
populism and offer the Italian democracy a new possible
future leadership.
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